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1. Introduction 
An important means by which market economies restructure and innovate is through the entry 
and exit of establishments.  Given the importance of business turnover for productivity growth, rigid 
entry barriers tend to protect incumbent firms’ interests to the detriment of productivity.   
Deregulation of entry has been a core component of recent market reforms in many countries. 
There are a number of channels through which reductions in entry barriers could influence aggregate 
productivity. First, theoretical models show that entry barriers generate misallocation by 
introducing distortions to profitability that inhibit reallocations of market shares across firms and 
reduce incumbent firms’ innovation incentives (Schivardi and Vivano, 2011; Hsieh and Klenow, 
2009). Second, the increase in competitive pressure entrants generate leads the least productive 
firms to exit and reallocates market share. Third, new firms are often the conduits of new 
technologies, products and processes that advance the technological frontier (Aghion et al., 2009). 
Finally, the threat of entry may spur incumbents to innovate (Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008). 
Establishing the causal effect of entry barriers on productivity poses a tricky identification 
challenge because entry barriers tend to be correlated with a wider set of government regulations 
and impediments that also affect productivity (e.g. taxation, monopoly power), or because an 
appropriate counterfactual does not exist. I circumvent these problems using a natural experiment 
in the U.S. agricultural sector. This setting allows me to observe an exogenous change in entry 
barriers and the productivity response within two similar industries. The findings indicate that 
productivity increases substantially following the removal of entry barriers. 
2. Data and Identification Strategy 
The data are drawn from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).  The NASS is the 
statistics branch of the U.S. Department for Agriculture and conducts hundreds of surveys each year 
on issues relating to agricultural production, demographics and the environment. As part of this 
mission the NASS administers an annual survey of crop yields, output, and acreage in each county.  
As in Butler and Cornaggia (2011), I proxy productivity using crop yield (tons produced per acre). I 
therefore have annual information on productivity and acres planted for several industries (sugar 
beet, corn, wheat, and barley) in each U.S. county over the period 1965 to 1985. Information on the 
price received for each crop is also available from the NASS, albeit at the state level. A summary of 
the data is reported in Table 1. 
 [INSERT TABLE 1] 
2.1 Institutional Detail 
The U.S. sugar manufacturing cartel was established under the New Deal in the Jones-Costigan Act 
of 1934 to limit sugar sales and restrict foreign sugar imports. Under the cartel plan, entry of firms 
into the sugar beet industry was prohibited. Existing sugar beet farmers were assigned an acreage 
quota based on pre-cartel planted acres that they could not exceed. Although it was illegal to sell the 
quota, it could be inherited by family members (Bridgman et al., 2009). Following an unexpected 
surge in world sugar consumption, sugar prices markedly increased during 1974 and political 
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support for the cartel evaporated. The Act was not renewed and the cartel and its provisions ceased 
in 1975, permitting free entry into sugar beet farming (Corley, 1975). Whereas entry into the sugar 
beet industry was prohibited until 1975, free entry into corn farming was permitted during the entire 
sample period. 
2.2 Identification Strategy 
The sharp asymmetry in treatment status between corn (the control group) and sugar beet (the 
treatment group), together with the plausibly exogenous collapse of the sugar cartel forms the 
backbone of my quasi-experiment. I pin down the causal effect of entry barriers on productivity using 
a difference-in-difference estimation strategy that estimates the equation 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑆𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐 +
𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 , (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 is yield per acre in industry 𝑖 of county 𝑐 at time 𝑡; 𝑆𝑢𝑔𝑎𝑟 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a dummy equal to 
1 if the observation is from the sugar beet industry, 0 for corn; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 is equal to 1 for the years 
1975 onwards, 0 otherwise; 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a vector of controls comprising acres planted; 𝛾𝑐  and 𝛾𝑡 are county 
and year dummies respectively; 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the state-
industry level. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
Figure 1 provides graphical evidence on the key identifying assumption of parallel trends. Given 
the high degree of co-movement between pre-treatment productivity in the two sectors, the fact that 
corn and sugar beet are grown in the same geographic areas, planted in spring and harvested in fall, 
the similarities between production practices in the two industries (tractors, ploughs and seeders 
are used during planting while combines are used during harvesting), and that corn and sugar beet 
are not grown in rotation, corn appears to be a valid counterfactual.  
3. Results 
 [INSERT TABLE 2] 
I begin by reporting descriptive evidence. Figure 1 shows a clear jump in sugar beet productivity 
in the aftermath of the sugar cartel’s failure that is not mirrored by corn productivity. This 
observation is supported by the formal estimation results in Table 2. In column 1 of Table 2 the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is estimated to be 3.64 tons per acre. This effect is both 
economically and statistically significant, equating to a 24% increase on pre-treatment average 
industry productivity. The sugar beet dummy coefficient indicates that a planted acre produces 
approximately 12 tons more sugar beet than corn, while the coefficient on the treatment dummy 
shows that yield per acre increased by only a modest amount within the control group post 1974. In 
addition, the acres planted variable is insignificant suggesting an absence of economies of scale.1 
An important question is to what extent input usage changed over the time period. While county-
level data are not available, historic versions of the U.S. Agricultural Census and industry-level data 
                                                          
1 The results are robust to trimming the sample to the years 1970 to 1980.  
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reported by USDC (1975) indicate that input expenditure in the corn and sugar beet industries 
remained broadly unchanged across the sample window. The previous findings therefore indicate 
improvements to technical efficiency.  
3.1 Robustness Testing 
Before concluding that entry barriers reduce productivity causally, I need to rule out potential 
confounding influences. In this setting the main concern regarding omitted variables is that the 
removal of entry barriers coincides with unknown contemporaneous improvements in the local 
business environment. To rule out this possibility I exploit the panel structure of the data to purge 
omitted variable bias. The results reported in column 2 are estimated conditional on county-year 
fixed effects that eliminate the confounding influence of time-varying, county-specific productivity 
factors common to both industries. An attractive property of this specification is that the treatment 
effect is estimated through between-industry variation within the county-year dimension of the data 
which provides exceptionally clean identification. The effect is now found to be 4.60 tons per acre. 
Next, in column 3 I flood the model with county-year, county-industry and industry-year fixed effects 
to remove additional omitted variables. This has very little impact on the main findings.  I continue 
to find the eradication of entry barriers to significantly increase productivity. The estimate is now 
equivalent to a 35% productivity gain relative to pre-treatment levels. 
Given that the results in column 3 are estimated conditional on a battery of fixed effects, the only 
plausible remaining source of bias is through contamination of the implied counterfactual which may 
occur if there were spillover effects on the control group. I address this issue from two angles.  First, 
I re-estimate equation (1) using alternative control groups. Despite this change, I continue to find 
ATTs of similar magnitude and statistical significance when I use wheat (column 4) and barley 
(column 5) as the control group. Second, I run Monte Carlo simulations to check that productivity in 
the corn sector was unaffected by treatment. I conduct this test by using only data from the corn 
industry. I then randomly assign counties to ‘treatment’ status and set the placebo treatment dummy 
equal to 1 for the years 1975 to 1985 for the ‘treated’, and 0 otherwise. Next, I estimate the equation 
𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 . (2) 
I repeat this procedure 1,000 times and save the p-value of the 𝛽 coefficient each time. The intuition 
underlying this test is that if spillover effects were present, I would disproportionately reject the 
(true) null hypothesis of 𝛽 = 0.  If spillover effects are not present the null hypothesis should only be 
rejected by chance (type-1 errors). The rejection rates at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels are 
4%, 1.1% and 0% respectively indicating the control group was unaffected by the treatment.2 
The downwards trend in sugar beet productivity during the years immediately preceding 
treatment raises the question of whether the results are driven by Ashenfelter’s dip. This is unlikely 
given the evolution of productivity is very similar within the control group. To rule out this possibility 
                                                          
2 I use the same procedure but using corn acres planted as the dependent variable to check whether acres were reallocated 
to the control group. The rejection rates are in line with type-1 errors indicating that no reallocation of acres took place 
(9.6%[10% level], 5.4%[5% level], 0.9%[1% level]). 
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I collapse the variables on their pre- and post-treatment means for each county-industry and re-
estimate equation (1) using the new data. The results in Table 2 column 6 are robust to this change. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
Could the treatment effect stem from a fixed number of incumbent producers shifting from 
collusive to non-collusive market behavior without actually being threatened by entrants post 1975? 
The data in Figure 2 indicate sustained reductions in the number of sugar beet farms post treatment 
which suggest that this was not the case.  
Finally, in column 7 I find the treatment caused a 29% increase in revenue per acre (measured as 
ln(yield * deflated prices)). 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, I show using a natural experiment that eliminating barriers to entry cause significant 
productivity improvements. This is consistent with the view that entry barriers inhibit creative 
destruction and create inefficiencies by reducing competition for market share which decreases 
innovation incentives and reallocation among incumbents. While I establish the net effect of entry 
barriers on productivity, future work should seek to establish the specific channels through which 
this is manifested. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Level of Aggregation 
Sugar beet 2,746 0.31 0.47 0 1 County-industry 
Yield 2,746 7.65 8.48 0.25 39.50 County-industry 
Acres planted (ln) 2,746 8.05 5.40 -13.82 12.40 County-industry 
Price ($) 2,746 11.91 15.08 0.97 51.40 State-industry 
Revenue (ln) 2,746 2.98 2.40 -1.12 7.43 County-industry 
 
 
Table 2 
Productivity Results 
Regression no. 1 2 3  4  5  6 7 
Control group Corn  Wheat  Barley  Corn Corn 
           
           
Sugar beet 12.9740*** 12.9237*** 12.4947***  11.7957***  17.3483***  10.3297*** 4.7168*** 
 (24.50) (97.69) (20.28)  (4.21)  (917.02)  (8.13) (48.65) 
Treatment 0.8082          
 (1.35)          
Sugar beet * Treatment 4.5351*** 5.2974*** 4.7509***  2.9072***  2.9296***  9.7633*** 0.2555** 
 (4.89) (3.62) (5.62)  (14.62)  (148.37)  (5.19) (2.23) 
Acres planted -0.0008 0.4780 -0.1930  -0.2796  -0.0000**  0.0653 0.0064 
 (-0.03) (1.40) (-0.38)  (-0.47)  (-2.54)  (1.06) (0.10) 
           
Observations 2,746 2,746 2,746  2,597  2,554  265 2,746 
R2 0.95 0.97 0.99  0.99  0.99  0.98 0.99 
County effects √        √  
Year effects √          
Period effects         √  
County-year effects  √ √  √  √   √ 
County-industry effects   √  √  √   √ 
Industry-year effects   √  √  √   √ 
Notes: The standard errors are clustered at the state-industry level and the associated t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 
Productivity Evolution 
 
Notes: This figure plots mean yield for each industry-year during the sample period. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Number of Producers 
 
Notes: This figure plots the number of sugar beet farms operating in the U.S. reported in the Census of Agriculture. Data are 
not available for the years preceding 1974. 
 
